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Abstract—Exploring a cooperative node as a friendly jammer
is an effective means of providing secure communication between
a source-destination pair in the presence of an eavesdropper. In
this work, we consider the use of a wireless-powered friendly
jammer. Without relying on external energy supply, the friendly
jammer is powered by the source node via wireless power
transfer. We apply a simple time-switching protocol where the
power transfer and jammer-assisted secure transmission occur in
different time blocks. By investigating the long-term behavior of
the communication protocol, we derive a closed-form expression
of the throughput. We further optimize the jamming power and
the rate parameters for maximizing the throughput subject to a
secrecy outage probability constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the high computational complexity of upper-layer
cryptosystems in dynamic wireless networks, techniques for
securing wireless communication at the physical layer has
attracted significant interest in the past decade [1–3]. In partic-
ular, cooperative jamming [4] has been demonstrated to be an
effective means to provide secure wireless communications [5–
8]. However, this is often realized at the expense of the
additional power consumption of the friendly jamming nodes.
For the convenience of deployment with mobility require-
ment and other constraints, the jamming nodes may not have
connection to power lines. Thus, similarly to other battery-
powered communication nodes not relying on the power lines,
a jammer’s lifetime is constrained by the energy stored in its
battery. The authors in [9] considered the deployment of an
energy harvesting friendly jammer which promises to greatly
enhance the lifetime of the jammer, so as to increase the secu-
rity of a communication link. However, conventional energy
harvesting methods rely on ambient energy sources which are
uncontrollable. In addition, the energy harvesting devices may
have large dimension requirements or high implementation
complexity and cost.
In this paper, motivated by the emerging research on radio-
frequency (RF) powered communication nodes with simple
RF energy conversion circuit [10], [11], we consider the
deployment of a friendly jammer which is wireless-powered by
the source node in a controlled manner and used for protecting
the secure communication between the source-destination pair
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Our contributions are as
follows:
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Fig. 1 System model with illustration of the power transfer and
information transmission blocks.
• We design a communication protocol that provides se-
cure transmission by using a friendly jammer which
is wireless-powered by the source node. This proto-
col simply switches between power transfer (PT) and
information transmission (IT) in different time blocks
depending on both the energy level at the jammer and
the channel between the source and the destination.
• We study the long-term behavior of the proposed pro-
tocol. Depending of the system parameters, the commu-
nication process has two kinds of long-term behavior:
energy accumulation and energy balanced. We derive a
closed-form expression of the achievable throughput of
the proposed protocol with fixed-rate transmission.
• We focus on the energy balanced case and study the
optimal protocol design. In particular, we optimize the
jamming power and the rate parameters of secure com-
munication to achieve the maximum throughput while
satisfying a constraint on secrecy outage probability. We
see that the optimal throughput reaches a finite upper
bound even if the source transmit power increases towards
infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication scenario where a source (S)
communicates with a destination node (D) in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper (E) with the help of a friendly
jammer (J). We assume that all nodes are equipped with a
single antenna. All the channel links are composed of large-
scale path loss with exponent m and small-scale Rayleigh
fading. These fading channel gains are modeled as quasi-
static frequency non-selection parameters, which means that
they are constant over the block time of T seconds, and
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) between blocks.
The channel state information (CSI) of the links from source
and jammer to the destination are assumed to be known at
both ends, but the CSI of the eavesdropping link is only
known to the eavesdropper itself. The distances and the fading
channel gains of the links i→ j, are denoted as dij and hij ,
i, j,∈ {S,D, J,E}, respectively. In addition, the noise power
at the eavesdropper is assumed to be zero as a worst-case
scenario.
The jammer is assumed to be an energy-constrained node
with no power of its own but equipped with a simple RF
energy harvesting circuit, which is use to harvest energy from
the RF signal from the source. We assume that the harvested
energy is stored in the jammer’s battery with infinite capacity.
The proposed friendly jammer assisted secure communica-
tion protocol, which will be described in detail later in Sec. II-
B, consists of two kinds of blocks in general: (i) power transfer
(PT) block and (ii) information transmission (IT) block shown
in Fig. 1. The signal models in PT and IT blocks are given
below:
A. Signal Model
1) PT: During a PT block, the source sends an RF signal,
xSJ (its variance is normalized to one), with power Ps. Thus,
the jammer receives
yJ =
1√
dmSJ
√
PshSJxSJ + nJ , (1)
where nJ is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at
the jammer. Then, yJ is converted to a direct current signal
and the energy stored in the battery. From (1), by ignoring the
noise power, the harvested energy is given by [12]
ρJ(hSJ) = η
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√dmSJ
√
PshSJ
∣∣∣∣∣
2
T, (2)
where η is the energy conversion efficiency of RF-DC con-
version operation for energy storage at the jammer. Because
hSJ is i.i.d. across all blocks with complex Gaussian distri-
bution with normalized variance, we have E
{|hSJ |2} = 1.
Therefore, the average harvested energy ρJ is given by
ρJ = E {ρJ(hSJ)} = E
{
η
1
dmSJ
Ps |hSJ |2 T
}
=
ηPsT
dmSJ
. (3)
2) IT: During an IT block, the source transmits the
information-carrying signal xSD (its variance is normalized
to one) with power Ps. At the same time, the jammer sends a
noise-like signal xJD (its variance is normalized to one) with
power PJ , affecting both the destination and the eavesdropper.
Thus, the received signal at the destination, yD, is given by
yD=
1√
dmSD
√
PshSDxSD + 1√
dmJD
√
PJhJDxJD + nd,
(4)
where nd is the AWGN at the destination with variance σ2d.
Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdropper, yE , is
given by
yE =
1√
dmSE
√
PshSExSD+ 1√
dmJE
√
PJhJExJD+ne, (5)
where ne is the AWGN at the eavesdropper which we have
assumed to be zero as a worst-case scenario.
From (4), the SINR at the destination is
γd =
Ps
dmSD
|hSD|2
σ2d +
PJ
dmJD
|hJD|2
, (6)
and the capacity of S → D link is given as
Cd = log2 (1 + γd) . (7)
Since |hSD|2 and |hJD|2 follow i.i.d. exponential distribu-
tion, γd has the cumulative distribution function (cdf) as
Fγd (x) = 1−
e
− xρd
1 + ϕx
, (8)
where
ϕ =
PJ
Ps
dmSD
dmJD
. (9)
For convenience, we define the SNR at the destination (without
jamming noise) as
ρd ,
Ps
dmSDσ
2
d
. (10)
From (5), the SINR at the eavesdropper is
γe =
1
φ
|hSE |2
|hJE |2 , (11)
where
φ =
PJ
Ps
dmSE
dmJE
. (12)
Hence, the capacity of S → E link is given as
Ce = log2 (1 + γe) . (13)
From [13], the probability density function (pdf) of γe is given
by
fγe (x) = φ
(
1
φx+ 1
)2
. (14)
B. Secure Communication Protocol
Now we describe the proposed secure communication pro-
tocol. We first explain the secure encoding scheme in each IT
block. Then, we describe how the protocol determines when
to transfer power and when to transmit information.
PT PT IT PT PT PT IT IT PT PT PT IT PT
timePT: Dedicated PT PT: Opportunistic PT
Fig. 2 Illustration of the proposed protocol.
1) Secure Encoding Scheme: In IT blocks, we consider
fixed-rate transmission of secret information from the source to
the destination, using Wyner’s wiretap code [14]. The wiretap
code has two rate parameters: rate of codeword transmission
and rate of secret information, denoted by Rt and Rs, respec-
tively. The positive rate difference, Rt − Rs, is the cost to
provide secrecy against the eavesdropper. Since we consider
quasi-static fading channel, we use outage based measures:
connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability,
which are defined, respectively, as
pco = Pr {Rt > Cd} , (15)
pso = Pr {Rt −Rs < Ce} . (16)
Given the values of the rate parameters, Rt and Rs, the
connection outage probability is a measure of the fading
channel quality of the S → D link, while the secrecy outage
probability is a measure of the secrecy level.
2) PT-IT Scheme: The jammer power PJ is determined
offline and kept constant in all IT blocks. The proposed
communication protocol determines whether to be in an IT
block (as opposed to a PT block) according to the following
two conditions: (i) At the beginning of the block, the jammer
has enough energy, PJT , to support jamming with power PJ
over a block of T seconds, and (ii) the link S → D does
not suffer connection outage, which means it can support the
codeword transmission rate Rt.
If both conditions are satisfied, the block is chosen to be
an IT block for transmitting the confidential information. If at
least one condition is not satisfied, the block is chosen to be
a PT block for wirelessly charging the jammer. Specifically,
if the first condition is not satisfied, then the PT block is
referred to as a dedicated PT block, which means the jammer
is short of energy for jamming and wireless power transfer
is absolutely necessary. If the first condition is satisfied but
the second condition is not, then the PT block is referred to
as an opportunistic PT block. This is the situation where the
communication link S → D does not support the transmission
rate Rt, hence an opportunity for PT occurs in this block
(because IT should not happen) in spite of the fact that the
jammer has already meet the energy requirement for jamming.
A illustration of the proposed protocol is given in Fig. 2.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Performance Metrics
We measure the long-term performance of our proposed
protocol using the throughput of transmission (i.e., the average
number of bits of confidential information received at the
destination per unit time), subject to a given secrecy constraint
against eavesdropping. Specifically, we describe the secrecy
constraint as a threshold on the secrecy outage probability,
i.e.,
pso ≤ ε, (17)
where ε is the threshold. Under such a secrecy constraint, we
compute the throughput as [13], [15]
pi = ptxRs, (18)
where ptx is the probability of the communication process
being in IT blocks, i.e., the percentage of time for secure
communication.
From the secure encoding scheme we adopted and the
secrecy outage probability in (16), when increasing Rs in order
to improve the throughput in (18), the constraint of secrecy
outage probability in (17) may be violated. From the PT-IT
scheme we proposed, the probability of being an IT block, ptx,
is related to (i) the jamming power PJ and (ii) the connection
outage probability of the link S → D, pco. Thus, in order to
calculate pi in (18), we have to find an explicit expression for
ptx, which is given in the following subsection.
B. Long-term Behavior and Information Transmit Probability
Focusing on the long-term behavior of the communication
process determined by our proposed protocol, it is easy to
figure out that the behavior of the communication process falls
in one of the following two cases:
• Energy Accumulation: In this case, on average, the energy
harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks is
higher than the energy required during an IT block. Thus,
in the long term, the energy steadily accumulates at the
jammer and there is no need for dedicated PT blocks (the
harvested energy by opportunistic PT blocks fully meets
the energy consumption requirement at the jammer).
• Energy Balanced: In this case, on average, the energy
harvested at the jammer during opportunistic PT blocks
is not larger than the energy required during an IT block.
Thus, in the long term, dedicated PT blocks are some-
times required to make sure that the energy harvested
from both dedicated and opportunistic PT blocks equals
the energy required for jamming in IT blocks on average.
We determine the conditions under which the communica-
tion process falls in either of the two cases in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. The communication process with the proposed
communication protocol leads to energy accumulation if
pco
1− pco >
PJT
ρJ
(19)
is satisfied. Otherwise, the communication process is energy
balanced.
Proof. The complete proof can be found in Appendix A in
[16] and is omitted here due to space constraints. 
Different communication behaviors lead to different results
for ptx. Nevertheless, we are able to obtain a general expres-
sion for ptx as presented in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1. The information transmission probability for the
proposed secure communication protocol is given by
ptx =
1
1 +max
{
PJT
ρJ
, pco1−pco
} . (20)
Proof. Due to space limitations, a sketch of the proof is given:
We first model the communication process in both energy
accumulation and energy balanced cases as Markov chains
and show the ergodicity of the process. This then allows us to
derive the stationary probability of a block being used for IT.
The detailed proof can be found Appendix B in [16]. 
Substituting (20) into (18), we have the expression of
throughput
pi =
Rs
1 + max
{
PJT
ρJ
, pco1−pco
} . (21)
From (7), (8) and (15), we get an expression of pco as
pco = 1− e
− 2Rt−1ρd
1 + PJPs
dmSD
dmJD
(2Rt − 1)
. (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), we obtain the achievable through-
put of the proposed protocol. In the next section, we will derive
the throughput under the secrecy outage constraint.
IV. OPTIMIZATION FOR ENERGY BALANCED DESIGN
In the last section, we see that there are two different long-
term behaviors of the communication process. In the rest of
the paper, we focus on the energy balanced case and study the
optimal offline design of the secure communication protocol.
The design parameters to optimize are the jamming power PJ ,
the codeword rate Rt and the secret information rate Rs. The
study on the energy accumulation case can be found in [16].
A. Optimization Problem and Solution
We consider the optimal secure communication design as
follows:
max
PJ ,Rt,Rs
pi
s.t. pso ≤ ε, pco/(1− pco) ≤ PJT/ρJ , PJ≥0, Rt≥Rs≥0,
(23)
where the first constraint is on the secrecy level and the second
constraint is the condition for the energy balanced case. This
design aims to maximize the throughput with the constraint
on the secrecy outage probability.
From (13), (14), (16) and (17), the constraint of secrecy
outage probability in (23) can be rewritten as
pso = P {Rt −Rs < log2 (1 + γe)} ≤ ε. (24)
By substituting (14) into (24), and after some simplification,
we have
PJ ≥ Ps d
m
JE
dmSE
(
ε−1 − 1)
2Rt−Rs − 1 . (25)
From (15), the energy balanced constraint in (23) can be
further simplified as(
1 +
PJ
Ps
dmSD
dmJD
(
2Rt − 1)) e 2Rt−1ρd − 1 ≤ PJT
ρJ
. (26)
From the expression of throughput in (21), it is easy to
verify that both of (25) and (26) are active constraints, i.e., by
adjusting the parameters, the throughput can always be further
improved if any of the two constraints is loose. Therefore, the
equalities hold in (25) and (26). Now, we have obtained the
optimal jamming power from (25),
P?J = Ps
dmJE
dmSE
(
ε−1 − 1)
2Rt−Rs − 1 , (27)
and by taking (26) and (27) into (23), the optimization problem
can be rewritten as
max
Rt,Rs≥0
Rs
1 + k1
2Rt−Rs−1
, s.t. (26) holds with equality,
(28)
where k1 =
dmSJ
η
dmJE
dmSE
(
ε−1 − 1), and PJ in the constraint is
substituted by (27).
From the constraint in (28), after some manipulations, Rs
can be expressed as a function of Rt, thus, the optimization
problem above can be further simplified as a one-dimensional
problem w.r.t. Rt. Calculating the derivative of the target
function in (28) w.r.t. Rt, after some simplifications, the
optimal codeword rate R?t is the root of following equation
which can be easily solved by a linear search:
ζ ′
(
1 + k1ζ
ln 2 (1 + ζ)
− k1 (Rt − log2 (1 + ζ))
ζ2
)
= 1, (29)
where
ζ =
k1 − k2e
2Rt−1
ρd
(
2Rt − 1)
e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1
, k2 =
dmJE
dmSE
dmSD
dmJD
(
ε−1 − 1),
(30)
ζ ′=
ln 2 e
2Rt−1
ρd(
e
2Rt−1
ρd − 1
)2(k2 2Rt (1 + 1ρd − e 2
Rt−1
ρd
)
− k1 + k2
ρd
)
,
and the optimal secret information rate, R?s = R
?
t −
log2 (1 + ζ
?), where ζ? is calculated by taking R?t into (30).
B. High SNR Regime
Depending on the power budget of the source node, it may
be allowed to increase the source transmit power Ps in order
to improve the system performance. It is not immediately clear
whether increasing Ps leads to better performance as it affects
the quality of signal reception at both the destination and
eavesdropper, as well as the power transfer to the jammer.
To obtain some insights, we consider the high SNR regime.
Note that we have defined SNR at the destination (without the
effect of jamming noise) as ρd in (10).
Corollary 1. When the SNR at the destination is sufficiently
high, the asymptotically optimal rate parameters and an upper
bound on throughput are given by
R˜?t = log2
(
1 +
k1
k2
)
, (31a)
p˜i? =
R˜?s
1 + k1
2R˜
?
t−R˜?s−1
, (31b)
where k2 is defined in (30), and the asymptotically optimal
secrecy rate R˜?s is obtained by solving the following equation
22(R˜
?
t−Rs) + (k1 − ln 2 k1Rs − 2) 2(R˜
?
t−Rs)− k1 = 0. (32)
Proof. The result is obtained in a straightforward manner by
letting ρd →∞ or equivalently Ps →∞. 
The upper bound on throughput implies that one cannot
effectively improve the throughput by further increasing Ps
when the SNR at the destination is already high. It is then
interesting to see how fast the throughput converges to the
upper bound as Ps increases.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to demonstrate
the performance of the proposed secure communication pro-
tocol. We set the path loss exponent as m = 3 and the length
of time block as T = 1 ms. We set the energy conversion
efficiency as η = 0.5 [12]. We assume that the source, jammer,
destination and eavesdropper are placed along a horizontal
line, and the distances are given by dSJ = 25 m, dSE = 40
m, dSD = 50 m, dJE = 15 m, dJD = 25 m, in line with [4].
We set σ2d = −100 dBm. We do not specify the bandwidth
of communication, hence the rate parameters are expressed in
units of bit per channel use (bpcu).
Fig. 3 shows that the optimal throughput in the energy
balanced design obtained in the previous section grows with
the source transmit power, but quickly reaches the upper bound
given in Corollary 1. Specifically, the upper bound is reached
at source transmit power of 10 dBm or less. Also we see that a
more stringent requirement (a lower threshold) on the secrecy
outage probability decreases the achievable throughput as we
expected.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated secure communication with
the help from a wireless-powered jammer. We proposed a
simple communication protocol and analyzed its long-term
behavior. Furthermore, we derived the achievable throughput
with fixed-rate transmission. For the design under energy
balanced behavior, we further optimized the jamming power
and the rate parameters to achieve the maximum throughput
subject to a secrecy outage probability constraint. Our analyt-
ical and simulation results show that as the source transmit
power increases, the throughput quickly reaches an upper
bound.
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balanced design.
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